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Abstract 
An agent want to buy products from e-market 
often encounters unknown suppliers, he then must 
choose between maximizing its expected utility 
according to the known suppliers and trying to 
learn more about the unknown suppliers, since this 
may improve its future rewards. This issue is 
known as the trade-off between exploitation and 
exploration. In this research, we study the problem 
of an agent how to select suppliers from electronic 
markets with incomplete information. The agent 
has no knowledge about suppliers, so he needs to 
learn the information by consuming their product 
and his object is to maximize total utility.  
We consider two different scenarios. The first 
is an agent selects a single supplier at each time 
period. By the introduction of Gittins index, we 
show that by using Gittins index technology, the 
agent can achieve the optimal solution. The second 
is an agent can select several suppliers at each time 
period, we propose four heuristic policies and 
evaluate them by building up a simulation tool. 
 
Keywords: Business Intelligence; select suppliers; 
incomplete information; multi-armed bandit 
problem 
 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, with the development of electronic 
commerce such as B2B (Business to Business), 
B2C (Business to customer) and C2C (Customer to 
Customer), an agent which wants to buy products 
or raw materials from electronic markets may find 
there are hundreds of suppliers available. It on the 
one hand provides many options for the agent, 
however, on the other hand make the agent much 
difficult to choose suppliers since the agent has no 
quality knowledge of each supplier. The agent can 
learn quality of product after using it, therefore the 
agent will have prior knowledge of supplier when it 
has experiences with the supplier. The prior 
knowledge can be used by the agent to decide 
which suppliers to choose next round. We consider 
situations when the agent need to buy products 
repeated from electronic markets and he prefers 
product with high quality and the lowest price. 
Product with high quality and lowest price ensures 
the high utility of the agent. Since in our context, 
agent is the representative of buyer, thus we abuse 
these two words hereafter without explicit 
explanation.  
The issue of uncertainty quality can also happen in 
traditional market, however, the situation is much 
more prevail in electronic market since buyers 
can’t see and touch the real product in advance. 
The information which can help buyers to make 
decision is pictures and description posted by 
suppliers. However, since surveillance service is 
still not good in electronic market, supplier with 
low quality might provide better pictures and 
description than supplier with high quality, thus 
agent could be misled and make wrong choice. 
Other factors such as larger number of suppliers, 
unstable markets, delivery time and so on make the 
uncertainty problem much more pronounced in 
electronic markets than traditional markets [1, 2]. 
Consider an agent want to buy fish oil online, he 
shall use fish oil as keyword and search it on 
Google, as a result, Google will return a long 
supplier list with different quality (condition, 
delivery time and etc). Thus the agent must decide 
which supplier to choose so as to maximize his 
utility. 
One may argue that buyer can choose supplier with 
the highest price, since in common sense, high 
price represents high quality. However, in 
electronic market, price can’t use to identify quality, 
since unknown supplier may exist, which provides 
product with high quality, but charge low price. Of 
course, there may suppliers sell product with low 
quality and high price. Consider, continue the 
above example, suppose dailyVita is the largest 
online supplier of fish oil, but there are other online 
suppliers sell the same fish oil as dailyVita with 
discounted price and may also provide better 
quality product, if quality can be measured as 
delivery time or customer service. This may due to 
other suppliers make deal with better delivery 
company.  
In situations where there are a lot of unknown 
suppliers and unknown suppliers may sell product 
with high quality and low price, buyers need to 
employ intelligence policies in order to choose the 
most profitable deals. We assume that past 
information can be used as a gauge to measure the 
quality of supplier. For example, if a buyer makes 
several deals with supplier A and observes that the 
mean quality of these deals is negative, thus he 
might not choose supplier A again due to the 
unhappy experience. However, on the other hand, 
if the history experience with supplier A is positive, 
buyer might choose supplier A again with high 
probability. Thus the dilemma of the buyer is 
whether to choose best known suppliers or try 
unknown suppliers so as to learn the quality of 
unknown supplier which may improve the future 
benefit of the buyer. This dilemma is also known as 
345
Chen Li-gang 
The 10th International Conference on Electronic Business, Shanghai, December 1 - December 4, 2010 
the trade-off between exploitation and exploration. 
The most pronounced problem of this dilemma is 
multi-armed bandit problem (MAB) [3, 4]. MAB 
problems are a class of sequential resource 
allocation problems concerned with allocating on 
or more resources among several alternative 
projects. Such problems are paradigms of making 
decisions that yield high current rewards, versus 
making decisions that sacrifice current rewards 
with the prospect of better future rewards. It can be 
described as follows: suppose there is a machine 
with several slots, each slot can generate a certain 
amount of reward. Rewards are drawn from a 
certain statistic distribution. A gambler can pull a 
single slot at each round and receive the reward 
generated by the slot. Since the gambler has no 
knowledge such as mean value and variance of 
each slot, he needs to learn the parameters by 
pulling them. The problem is what sequence of the 
slots gambler should pull so as to maximize his 
total reward. One can easily find that the problem 
faced by buyer is similar with the gambler if 
suppliers can be treated as slots. 
Rina and Sarit[5] consider the same problem 
context as described above and apply Gittins Index 
technology to choose supplier in the condition of 
incomplete information. They show that how to 
select supplier using Gittins Index in different 
settings: consider the probability of the agent to 
buy at each time period and different sizes of 
purchases. However in their settings, they don’t 
consider the risk attitude of buyers and the size of 
suppliers. They assume that at each time period, the 
agent can only choose a single supplier. Though the 
assumption is reasonable and enables them to 
employ Gittins Index, the true situation is that 
buyer can choose any supplier at each round. Select 
multiple suppliers at each time period can be 
modeled as multi-armed bandit problem with 
multiple plays (MABMP), but the solution of 
MABMP remains unsolved.  In this paper, we 
extend the work of Rina and Sarit. We consider the 
risk attitude of buyer as well as the size of supplier 
buyer can choose. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we 
discuss related work and, in Section3 we present 
the formal model. We extend the model and discuss 
how to consider the risk attitude of buyer in Section 
4. Section 5 presents some heuristic algorithm for 
multiple-supplier choosing problem. Finally, in 
Section 6, we provide conclusions and suggestions 
for future extensions.  
2. Related Work 
The issue of making decision with incomplete 
information is widely studied. Eric[6] investigates 
dynamic pricing strategies for maximizing revenue 
in an internet retail channel by actively learning 
customers’ demand response to price. Wang[7] 
formulate the optimal pricing problem with a 
bandit model and characterize the solution by 
means of stochastic dynamic programming. Cathy 
and Parijat[8] also study the dynamic pricing issue 
in e-Services, instead of using standard bandit 
process they combines annealing algorithm with 
Bayesian learning to balance the trade-off of 
exploitation and exploration. Rina and Sarit[5] use 
Gittins Index technology to select supplier in an 
environment of incomplete information. 
Salganicoff and Ungar[9] use Gittins index to 
select actions which optimally trade-off exploration 
and exploitation, they combine Gittins indices with 
decision trees to develop a mapping from state and 
action to success or failure of that action. Pandey 
and Olston[10] consider how a search engine 
should select advertisements to display with search 
results, they model advertisement placement as a 
multi-armed bandit problem, their algorithms are 
based on upper confidence bound[11] algorithm 
which is mainly to solve non-stochastic 
multi-armed bandit problem. 
The traditional supplier choosing problem is 
mainly about how to select a supplier among 
several criteria: quality, delivery reliability, product 
performance and unit price [12, 13]. Unlike in an 
uncertainty setting, all criteria are known in 
advance. However, as we show above, in the 
environment of e-business, most of the criteria are 
unknown which make the traditional supplier 
selection tools ineffective. That’s why we need to 
discuss the problem with incomplete information. 
Generally, products are classified into three 
different types: products with a quality ascertained 
by buyer before a purchase; products with a quality 
that is learned after the products have been bought; 
products have a quality that can hardly be learned 
even after consumption. In this paper, we assume 
that products’ quality can be inferred after 
consumption.  
Since an agents in our context need to decide 
between choosing best known suppliers or trying 
other suppliers in order to learn the quality of their 
products. The technologies for exploitation and 
exploration trade-off are known as reinforcement 
learning. The most used technologies are: the 
dynamic programming approach [14] which is 
expensive in time and space; the heuristic forward 
iteration algorithms [15]; the Gittins allocation 
index [3, 4], also known as dynamic allocation 
index, which can be used in cases of reward. 
Gittins index technology is proven to yield the 
highest expected utility when single supplier is 
available per round, but when in the background of 
multi-suppliers per time, Gittins index in not 
necessary optimal. Thus, we prefer Gittins index 
when the single supplier situation is discussed, 
however, we will employ heuristic forward 
iteration algorithms when the multiple suppliers 
situation is presented.  
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3. Formal model with single Supplier 
Consider an agent facing a market of N suppliers 
who sell a given item, the quality of the item sold 
by supplier i is iu , the standard deviation is iσ  
and its price is ip , the agent need to buy the item 
regularly at discrete time period.  At each time 
period, the agent must choose one supplier among 
the N suppliers, he has no knowledge about the 
mean quality and deviation about each supplier, but 
he knows the price of each supplier, besides, the 
agent maintains a history of in  length of previous 
interactions with supplier i . Then the average 
quality and standard deviation of supplier i is ix  
and iˆs  respectively. The utility of the agent 
buying an item from supplier i with quality ix and 
price ip  is ix - ip . 
3.1 Two supplier scenario and Gittins Index 
We first introduce the simplest situation in which 
the agent only facing two suppliers S (safe) and R 
(random). The agent has full information about safe 
supplier and its quality SX , while alternative 
supplier R is unknown to the agent and its quality 
RX  whose distribution law f on  also 
unknown to the agent. We assume that the agent 
has a prior on f . In a dynamic environment, the 
agent may learn about the distribution law f of 
the random quality RX  by buying product from R 
and observing realizations ( )RX t  of RX at time 
period t  and update his prior on f after t . The 
agent selects a {( }) ,Y St R∈  at each time period t . 
Then the total utility of the agent can be formulated 
in a stochastic discounted inter-temporal matter: 
0
( ( )) ( ( ( ), ( 1)))tU Y H Y t X tρ
+∞
⋅ = Φ +∑  (1) 
Where [0,1]ρ ∈  is the discount rate, 
( , ( 1))S X tΦ + = SX , ( , ( 1))R X tΦ + = ( )RX t . 
( )H ⋅  is the utility function. Since we assume that 
agent’s utility can be expressed by the subtraction 
of quality and price, thus when supplier R  is 
selected,  ( )H ⋅  is ( )RX t - Rp . 
The above problem is a standard approach of 
classical bandit problem. It’s one armed bandit 
problem because the state of arm S is stationary. 
The state of the other arm R tˆf  is a Markov 
process whose transition subject to the Bayesian 
updating with respect to the observation of ( )RX t . 
Gittins index is an optimal strategy for this bandit 
problem. At a certain stage, the agent need to 
compute index of each arm and the optimal 
strategy is to select the arm with the higher index. 
The state of the selected arm evolves according to a 
given rule, but the states of other arms remain 
unchanged. Gittins index is defined as follows: 
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While 0v is the initial state of a given arm, ( )Φ ⋅ is 
reward function of state tv . The index is the 
maximal average reward over a stopping time of 
the arm. The index value also makes the option of 
continuation or retirement no differences. As in our 
context, since the index of supplier S is constant, 
then given ( )GI S , ( , )GI R v  and the state 
ˆ
t tv f=  at stage t , the optimal strategy is to select 
the supplier with the higher index: supplier S if 
( )GI S > ( , )tˆGI R f and supplier R else. 
The calculation of Gittins index by definition (2) 
is difficult. Fortunately, there is a convenient 
approach to compute Gittins index. Let 
ˆ( ), ,xg s n denotes the index value of an arm with a 
history of n length, average value of x  and 
standard deviation sˆ , Gittins proved that [16]  
ˆˆ, , (0,1, )( )x s n x sgg n+=   (3) 
In (3), (0,1, )g n is the standard Gittins index with 
mean value 0, standard deviation 1, and history 
length n . Gittins calculated (0,1, )g n  given 
different combinations of discount rate and n . This 
show that multiplying the standard index value by 
the deviation of the arm’s reward and adding the 
average reward of the arm forms the index value of 
the arm. It can be observed that as an arm’s average 
rewards increases, its index value increases too. 
The standard deviation and the history length also 
play important roles in the index calculation. Since 
the standard Gittins index is only significant when 
n  is small ( n <10), when n  is getting larger 
(0,1, )g n  becoming small drastically. Thus 
ˆ (0,1, )sg n  shows that the contribution of the 
standard deviation of an arm to the index value 
decreases greatly when its history length increases. 
It can be explained as follows: when the experience 
to an arm is low (history length is small) it is better 
to select arm with highly risky (higher standard 
deviation), because the risky arm might generate 
high rewards in the future. However, as the 
experience of an arm is long enough, then the 
average rewards will take dominance in the 
calculation of the index value. The theory behind it 
is that the law of larger numbers ensures that when 
history length is long enough the average rewards 
is extremely close to its mean rewards. 
Proposition 1. Consider two agents with common 
prior belief 0f , and one agent is more risk averse 
than the other. If at the beginning, the more 
risk-averse agent selects supplier R based on 0f , 
then the less risk-averse agent will select R too. 
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And as long as the more risk-averse agent selects 
supplier R, so does the less risk-averse agent.  
The proposition is proved by Chancelier[17], it 
implies that the agents can be ranked by their 
degree of risk aversion.  Based on proposition 1, 
we have direct corollary 1 and corollary 2. 
Corollary 1. If the less risk-averse agent selects 
supplier S based on 0f , so does the more 
risk-averse agent, and as long as the less 
risk-averse agent selects supplier S, so does the 
more risk-averse agent. 
Corollary 2. The number of times agent select 
supplier R is a decreasing function of the degree of 
its risk-aversion. 
Proposition 2. An agent selects the safe supplier if 
and only if the index value of random supplier R 
less than the index value of safe supplier S, and 
once an agent selects the safe supplier, he would 
stick to the safe supplier forever. 
Proof. The first assertion is the major result of 
optimal strategies for bandit problems. That is 
choose the higher index at every stage. If the agent 
selects the safe supplier, thus the state of the 
random supplier remains fixed. Then the index 
value of supplier S will always larger than supplier 
R at the future stages, therefore, the agent shall 
select safe supplier all the time. 
3.2 Multiple Suppliers Scenario 
Problem Statement: an agent wants to buy an item 
from N suppliers repeatedly, but he has no 
knowledge about the quality of each suppliers. The 
agent’s object is to maximize his utility.  
Proposition 3. Given the price ip  of supplier i  
and remains as a constant, then the calculation of 
Gittins index is as follows:       
ˆˆ, , (0,1,( ))i i i i i i ix s ng x s g n p+ −=     (4) 
Proof. Since the price ip  is a constant over time, 
it will not influence iˆs  on the whole. As we 
assume above, the utility of the agent can be 
expressed as the subtraction of quality and price, 
then the price ip  just decreases the agent’s utility 
from select supplier i . Actually, the Gittins index 
can be divided into two parts: exploitation and 
exploration where ix  is the part of exploitation 
and ˆ (0,1, )i is g n is the part of exploration. The 
constant ip  doesn’t influence the exploration part, 
let the exploitation part be ix - ip , then the 
structure of Gittins index is maintained. ∎ 
The proposition makes sure that the agent only 
pays more for higher quality. This does accord with 
economic sense. 
Based on the proposition 3, the optimal strategy for 
the agent is straight. The steps are as follows: 
Step 1: at every stage t , compute Gittins 
index of every supplier ˆ, ,( )i i ix s ng  according to 
(4). 
Step 2: select supplier j  with the largest 
Gittins index value, that is 
     arg max ( ˆ, , )
i i i i
xj sg n=  
Step 3: choose supplier j  and, buy product 
from j , observe the quality of the product 
and update parameters as follows: 
(1) 
( 1)
1
j j j j
j
j
n x x n
x
n
+ +
=
+
 
(2) ( )
1
2
1
1 ( )ˆ
jn
j j j
kj
x k x
n
s
+
=
= −∑  
(3) 1j jn n= +  
Step 4: move on to the next time period and 
repeat step 1 to step 3. 
There is an important issue to use the Gittins index 
in the above strategy. The standard Gittins index 
(0,1, )ig n  requires a history length in  at least 
larger than 2, i.e. the agent must buy product from 
each supplier at least two times first. If there are 
too many suppliers in the market, then the agent 
must spend a lot of opportunities in order to meet 
the requirement of 2 history length. In this situation, 
the agent faces double bandit processes. At each 
time period, the agent needs to select supplier from 
the suppliers with history length larger than 2 or 
select new supplier with no history. In order to 
cope with the new supplier issue, the agent must 
balance the trade-off select old suppliers or new 
suppliers. Though there is not optimal strategy for 
the new supplier issue, the agent can employ a 
heuristic to solve it: at the initial stages, when all 
suppliers are new, the agent needs to explore new 
suppliers aggressively, as the agent has a lot of old 
suppliers, he might want to look at the old suppliers 
more often, thus he can employ a greedy algorithm 
to decide which group of supplier to select. The 
process is: set up a probability w , with probability 
w choose supplier from old supplier group and 
with probability 1- w from new group. When the 
group of old supplier is big enough, then the agent 
needs to gradually increase w  so as to make sure 
the agent can take advantage of exploitation 
sufficiently for the sake of utility maximization. 
 
4 Choosing K-Suppliers Problem 
Section 3 discusses the issue of how to select a 
single supplier per stage and provide optimal 
strategies by using Gittins index technology. 
Choose a single supplier per stage is suitable for 
small businesses, but as for big corporation, for the 
sake of diminish risk, they might want to buy 
product from different supplier, or at each time 
period, the agent want to select k-suppliers from all 
the supplier pool.  
Problem statement: an agent wants to buy items 
from N suppliers repeatedly, at every stage, he 
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shall select k-suppliers, but he has no knowledge 
about the quality of each suppliers. The agent’s 
object is to maximize his utility. 
The problem of selecting k-suppliers can be 
modeled as multi-armed bandit problem with 
multiple plays, i.e. the gambler can pull multiple 
slots at each time period. Though there are a lot 
concerns about the MABMP problem, the optimal 
solution is still not ready. In this section, we 
provide several heuristic algorithms for it and by 
constructing a simulation platform we evaluate 
these algorithms in different settings. 
The first algorithm is based on Gittins index. Since 
Gittins index is optimal for single supplier scenario, 
we believe the index value is a good heuristic 
information for each supplier. The process is as 
follows: 
Step 1. Select each supplier two times by any 
order; 
Step 2. Compute Gittins index for every 
supplier according to equation (4); 
Step 3. Select k suppliers with the k-highest 
Gittins index; 
Step 4. Buy product from these k suppliers, 
observe their quality and update 
parameters as follows: 
        For j=1 to k 
     (1) 
( 1)
1
j j j j
j
j
n x x n
x
n
+ +
=
+
 
(2) ( )
1
2
1
1 ( )ˆ
jn
j j j
kj
x k x
n
s
+
=
= −∑  
(3) 1j jn n= +  
       End for 
Step5. move on to the next time period and 
repeat step 3 and 4. 
The second heuristic algorithm is 
straightforward. We call it uniform play and 
empirical best (UPEB). The process is as follows: 
Step 1. Fix up a positive integer M ; 
Step 2. Select each supplier M times at any 
order; 
Step 3. Compute the utility of each supplier 
Step 4. Always select the k-highest utility 
suppliers for the future time period. 
The third heuristic algorithm is interval estimation 
strategy (IES). IES strategy choose suppliers by 
estimate their upper quality bound and choose the 
k-highest upper quality bound suppliers at every 
time period. The process is as follows: 
Step 1. Set up a quantile a ; 
Step 2. Select each supplier two times at any 
order. 
Step 3. For 1i = to N  
  Compte the upper bound of each supplier 
as (5) 
2
,
(1)
2
ˆi i i i
student
e x supp r pαα = + −  (5) 
 End for ( 2 (1)studentα  denotes the student 
distribution function with 
freedom 1 and  quantile 
/ 2a ) 
Step 4. Select the k-highest ,iupper α  
suppliers 
Step 5. Buy product from the suppliers at step 
4, observe their quality and update 
related parameters: 
       For j=1 to k 
1j jn n= +  
1 1 ( )jj j j j
j j
n
x x x n
n n
−
= +
 
( )2
1
ˆ 1 ( )
1
jn
j j j
ij
s x i x
n =
 
= −  −  
∑  
2
,
( 1)
ˆ jj j j
j
student n
upper x
n
α
α σ
−
= + - jp  
         End for 
     Step 6. Repeat step 4 and step 5. 
The reason we use student distribution to compute 
the upper bound is that, when we have no 
knowledge about the mean value and variance, the 
normal distribution is the most common used 
distribution to represent it. 
The last heuristic policy is called stepwise 
T-checked policy (STP), this policy also uses the 
student distribution, and the process is as follows: 
Step 1. Set up a quantile a , a positive integer 
B  
Step 2. Select all suppliers two times at any 
order; 
Step 3. Compute the utility of every supplier 
based on the two samples. 
Step 4. Select the k-highest utility suppliers 
For the B lowest utility suppliers in the 
k-highest suppliers i  
For other suppliers not in the k-highest 
suppliers j  
      Let stat=
ˆ
j i
j
j
x
s
x
n
−
 
      If stat< ( 1)jstudent nα− −  
     Then substitute supplier i with 
supplier j  
 End for  
End for 
Step 5. Buy product from the revised 
k-suppliers, and then update their 
mean quality and standard deviation. 
Step 6. Repeat step 4 and step 5. 
In order to test the performance of these four 
heuristic strategies, we build up a simulation 
platform with different settings. In our simulation, 
we defined several agents which behave 
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according to the strategies above. The quality of 
the products produced by each supplier is derived 
from a normal distribution, but the details of this 
distribution are unknown to the agents. The mean 
quality and price of each supplier is drawn 
randomly from the interval [20,140] in all runs, 
and the standard deviation is drawn randomly 
from the interval [40,100].  
In our first simulation, the size of suppliers is 40, 
and the agent can choose 10 suppliers 
simultaneously at every time period. We let the 
horizon be 200, and run the simulation 10000 times. 
The result is presented in table 1. 
Table 1 simulation results with 40 suppliers 
and 10 available per period with 200 horizons     
UPEB1, UPEB2, UPEB3, UPEB4 and UPEB5 
are the agents of UPEB with the value of 
M 5,8,10 and15 respectively. STP1, STP2 and 
STP3 are the agents of STP policy with the value 
of B 2, 3 and 4 respectively. GIH is the policy 
based on Gittins index. The result shows that all 
UPEB-based policies are strictly worse than other 
policies. Among the five UPEB policies, UPEB2 
whose sample time is suitable achieve the best 
utility. Since small sample times lead to 
under-exploration, large sample times lead to 
over-exploration. Indeed, Gittins index is good 
heuristic information, though it doesn’t achieve the 
best value. The outputs of IEP and STP are very 
close, and STP2 is the best strategy over all. The 
reason is similar with UPEB. 
We extend the total horizon to 300 periods. We 
find that the STP2 is the best strategy also. The 
total utility of all agents is double than 200 periods, 
that’s because during the first 200 periods, the agents spend a lot of periods on exploration. 
Let the size of supplier is 60 and other settings are 
the same as the first simulation, the result is 
showed in table 2. 
The results are similar with table1, but the best 
strategy is IEP. The reason might be as the size of 
supplier increases, the upper bound policy can find 
more high quality suppliers with low price. The three simulations show that the agent should employ IEP or STP strategy since they can yield the best utility. When the size of supplier is relatively small, the agent should favor STP strategy, and when the size of supplier is relatively large, the agent should favor IEP strategy. 
 
Table 2 simulation results with 60 suppliers and 
10 available per period with 200 horizons 
 
Agent UPEB1 UPEB2 UPEB3 UPEB4 UPEB5 
Total 
utility 96137 
92145 86898 71328 53122 
Agent GIH IEP STP1 STP2 STP3 
Total 
utility 
110079 113984 111271 111306 110890 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this research, we discuss the issue of select 
suppliers from e-market with incomplete 
information. We show that the problem can be 
modeled by the multi-armed bandit problem. We 
first consider the simplest scenario where there are 
only two suppliers in the market and the agent has 
full information of safe supplier, then we show how 
to solve it by the technology of Gittins index and 
the impact of risk-aversion. Besides, we show that 
Gittins index is also optimal when there are several 
suppliers.  
We also consider the situation when an agent can 
choose multiple suppliers simultaneously at each 
time period. We provide four heuristic policies to 
solve the trade-off of exploitation and exploration 
issue of multiple suppliers’ selection problem. In 
order to test the performance of different policy, we 
develop a simulation tool and shows that the agent 
should favor STP policy when the size of supplier 
is relatively small and IEP policy otherwise. 
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